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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATF OF UTAH
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY A.
MADSEN, his wife,

RECEIVE J
W

Case |No. 1 4 5 ^

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Elm</\ ; : f

1 3 JUN1977

vs.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION,

BRIGHAM YOUNG broVaOt.Y

J. Reuben Clark Law School

Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF NEWLY UNCOVERED CASES
Pursuant to Rule 75 (p) (3), Ut^h Rules of Civil Procedure, respondent submits the attached pages of newly uncovered cases for insertion in the brie| of respondent, all
cases applying to Point III of respondent's brief.
DATED this

/)

day of November, 1976.
MOYLE & DRAPER— ,->

J Joseph J. Palmer
Attorneys for Respondent
600 peseret Plaza
Salt|Lake City, Utah 84111

FILED
NOV 5 " 19'6
Clerk, Supreme Court,

- 43a Brooks v. Valley National Bank (Sup.Ct. of Ariz.,
April, 1976), 548 P.2d 1166 ("Brooks II"), supersedes the
opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals Jin Brooks v. Valley
National Bank, 539 P.2d 958 (1975) ("Brooks I"), cited at
page 31 of respondent's brief.

Brooks III sustained the

Superior Court's granting of motion to dismiss the action,
as did Brooks I, holding:

(a) a trust Was not created for

the impounded funds even though the worqs "in trust" were
used in the mortgage documents, and (b) the bank was not
unjustly enriched through use of the funds.

The reasoning

follows the opinion in Brooks I cited in respondent's brief.
The concurring opinion in Brooks II reasoned that a trust
i

was created because the bank received the funds to be applied
to a particular purpose but, nevertheless, the dismissal of
the complaint was still proper, saying:
Brooks relies on the general rule of law
that it is the duty of a trustee to protect the interests of the beneficiary of
a trust by the exercise of reasonable
care and diligence in the management of
the trust property, Bulla v. valley National Bank of Phoenix, 82 Ariz. 84, 308
P.2d 932 (1957), and the genetal rule that
that trustee has a duty to invest the
trust property so that it is made productive for the beneficiary. Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, §181 (195P). Where,
however, a rule of law might btherwise
be applicable to an agreement, custom or
usage may make such rule of ljaw inapplicable. Williston, Law of Contracts,
§648 (3rd ed. 1961).

- 43b The practice of requiring impound
payments has existed since th0 early
1930's. In every instance, without exception, where a suit has beer| brought
to compel payment of interest or the
earnings on the investment of the impound
funds, the lending institution has not
paid the mortgagor for the us^ of the impound funds. Nor is there anywhere the
slightest suggestion that the|Valley National Bank or any lending institution
ever paid for the use of impound funds.
While a few isolated in stancees will
not prove a usage, one so fi rm ly established for so many years nat i0nwide should
be controlling. A usage will be binding if
it is uniform, long establi shed , and so
well known that it can be sai that the
parties contracted with re ferenc e to it
and the failure to conform to it would be
the exception. Cleveland etc R.R. Co. v.
Jenkins, 174 111 398, 51 N.E. 811. Nor
is a usage invalid because itfe effect is
different from a general rule of law.
It is well settled jthat a trade
usage which is contrary to a statute
or which contravenes public policy is
invalid and may not be invoked; but
where a rule of law is or a character
that the parties may make it inapplicable to their contract by express
agreement, they may likewise render
it inapplicable by implied usage or
by usage." Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83
F.2d 425, 431 (10th Cir.l 1936).
I am therefore of the opinion that by
banking usage neither interes t nor earnings
on investment was expected to be credited
to the mortgagor.
A not-yet-reported decision ib Throp v. Bell
Federal Savings & Loan A s s o c , Ill.App.Ct., Docket No.
60252, decided July 26, 1976, aff'd on rehearing, 10-7-76.

- 43c It affirmed granting of defendant's motion to dismiss of
plaintiff's claim for earnings on the escrow funds, saying
"the use or non-use of the words 'in trifist1 is not the
controlling criteria as to whether an express trust has or
has not been created."

It is the most recent decision on

the subject and contains a review of recent authorities
similar to other cases cited in respondent's brief.

Its

reasoning is applicable to appellants' simplistic argument
as to use of the word "pledge" in the mortgage document.
Finally, we cite the Report of Committee on Real
I
Estate Financing entitled "Class ActionB Under Antitrust
Laws on Account of Escrow and Similar Practices," Real
Property Probate and Trust Journal of the American Bar
Association Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law,
Volume 11, No. 2, Summer, 1976. It concludes:
If lenders begin to pay interest on
escrow accounts, realistically the addi
tional expenses that result wpLll in some
manner be borne by borrowers ^ither by
a carrying charge or increase in the loan
rates which would cover thesel expenses.
In short the payment of interest on escrow
accounts would not result in |any economic
benefit to borrowers and would in all probability increase costs at leas|t on smaller
loans.
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